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I. The concept of collaborative economy
One of  the innovations brought by the economy of  the 21st century was the 
emergence of  electronic platforms accessible through any computer or a simple 
mobile phone that enable the shared use of  goods or services.
These platforms had a disruptive effect on several sectors of  economic activity 
allowing, in many cases, the division of  the cost of  using a good and, as so, making 
it more accessible to consumers.
Sharing economy, typically, would be concerned with the business model called 
point-to-point (peer-to-peer – P2P), through which anyone can transact or share 
goods or services directly to another without intermediary.1
Still, it turns out that a large part of  the existing electronic platforms act as a 
professional intermediary in the supply and demand of  goods or services between 
two different people. As so, one can’t speak of  a point-to-point business model.2 
In contrast, it’s a business model that involves three distinct entities: the seller or 
service provider, the intermediary, and the buyer of  the good or service. Many point 
out, therefore, that electronic platforms do not act passively but replicate a business 
to consumer business model (B2C) by which they seek to aggregate supply and 
demand in certain markets (running the platform as a market–maker in bilateral or 
multilateral markets).3 This model is present in platforms such as Uber (in the urban 
transport sector) or Airbnb (local accommodation).
The difference between P2P and B2C business models has motivated some 
conceptual confusion. Several refer to the first (P2P) as collaborative economy while 
the second (B2C) is referred to as sharing economy.4 Others also describe the latter 
as collaborative economy.
1 Distinguishing professional sellers from occasional (peers) ones, see Liran Einav, Chiara Farronato and 
Jonathan Levin, “Peer-to-Peer Markets,” Annual Review of  Economics, vol. 8, issue 1 (2016): 622, https://web.
stanford.edu/~leinav/pubs/AR2016.pdf. Also Zoe Cullen and Chiara Farronato, “Outsourcing Online 
Tasks: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms”, Working Paper (February 
2018), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b50f/b4df2c1463973c6e3b738bf90db7b5f8ccSeepdf.
2 See Giana M. Eckhardt and Fleura Bardhi, “The Sharing Economy Is not About Sharing at All”, 
Harvard Business Review (January 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/the-sharing-economy-isnt-about-
sharing-at-all. As well observed by Margherita Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, “Uber and the 
challenges for antitrust law and regulation,” Media Laws – Rivista di diritto dei media, vol. 1 (2018): 177, 
http://www.medialaws.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Colangelo.pdf, “sharing is not an accurate 
description of  the services that run on digital platforms like Uber”.
3 Analyzing from an economic perspective of  the impact in competition of  bilateral (two-sided platforms) or 
multilateral (multi-sided platforms), see Jean Tirole and Jean-Charles Rochet, “Platform competition in two-
sided markets,” Journal of  the European Economic Association, vol. 1, No. 4 (June 2003): 990-1029, https://www.
rchss.sinica.edu.tw/cibs/pdf/RochetTirole3.pdf; David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, “The antitrust 
analysis of  multi-sided platform businesses,” Working Paper 18783 (February 2012), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w18783; Cyril Ritter, “Antitrust in two-sided markets: looking at the US Supreme Court’s Amex 
case from an EU perspective,” Journal of  European Competition law in Practice, lpy077 (2018), https://academic.
oup.com/jeclap/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeclap/lpy077/5281284 and Dirk Auer and Nicolas Petit, 
Two-Sided Markets and the Challenge of  Turning Economic Theory into Antitrust Policy, January 20, 2015, https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2552337.
4 In this sense see Christoph Busch, “The sharing economy at the CJEU: does Airbnb pass the ´Uber 
test`?”, EuCML, issue 4 (2018): 172-174; Roberta A. Kaplan, “Regulation and the Economy Shaping”, 
NYLJ, vol. 252, No. 12 (2014); Christopher Koopman et al., “The Sharing Economy and Consumer 
Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change”, The Journal of  Business & Entrepreneurship the Law, 
vol. 8, issue 2 (May, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2535345 and Alessio Di Amato, “Uber and the 
Sharing Economy,” The Italian Law Journal, vol. 02, No. 01 (2016): 185.
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The definition of  collaborative economics is therefore not consensual.5
However, one can say that there is a gradual convergence between the institutions 
of  the European Union around the concept of  collaborative economy, associated 
with several electronic platforms.6
We will therefore use the concept of  collaborative economy and collaborative 
platforms to express the B2C business model used, by which a third entity is 
responsible for ensuring the intermediation between supply and demand in a given 
relevant market.
The concept of  collaborative economy (B2C) seems to be more rigorous, since, 
as we shall see, collaborative platforms exercise, in most cases, an economic activity 
that is not strictly confused with direct sharing of  goods or services between two 
entities (P2P).
II. The activity carried out by collaborative platforms
1. The position of  the European Commission
The assessment of  the consequences of  collaborative platforms has generated 
some controversy since it’s needed to adequate them into the current legal framework. 
One has to know if  platforms are service providers stricto sensu – submitted to the 
Services Directive7 – or providers of  “information society services” – and, in this 
context, to the E-commerce Directive.8
The consequences of  subsuming collaborative platforms to one or the other 
Directive are not negligible.
The implementation of  the first – the E-commerce Directive – determines 
that, the so-called “internal market clause” provided for in Article 3, paragraph 2 of  
the Directive, which prevents Member States from restricting the free movement of  
information society services from another Member State, should be respected.9
In a different way, the regulation of  the Services Directive to platforms not 
covered by the E-commerce Directive determines a subsequent and specific analysis 
of  the services provided through the platform since, in some cases, they may be 
excluded from the subjective scope of  the Services Directive as it does not apply to 
sectors such as transport, financial services, temporary work and health services.10
This is a problem that has been discussed in the past by the European 
5 Discussing the existence of  a hat-concept for sharing and collaborative economy, see Daniela Selloni, 
Codesign for public-interest services (Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 15-20.
6 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions a European Agenda for 
Collaborative Economy [COM (2016) 356 final], Brussels, 06 February 2016 and the European 
Parliament Resolution of  15 June 2017, on a European Agenda for Collaborative Economy (2017/2003 
(ΙΝΙ)). The weight of  the collaborative economy in the European Union is equivalent to € 26.5 billion 
(about 0.17% of  GDP in the EU in 2016) and employs around 394,000 people. These data can be 
found at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/collaborative-economy-studies_enployment.
7 Directive 2006/123 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 December 2006 on 
services in the internal market (“Services Directive”).
8 Directive 2000/31 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of  information society services (“E-commerce Directive”).
9 This means that a collaborative platform considered to provide “information society services” is 
covered by this Directive and can operate throughout the European Union.
10 See Article 2 (2) of  the Services Directive.
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Commission in the Communication issued in 2016 entitled “A European Agenda for 
Collaborative Economy”.11
In that document, the Commission considered that the equalization of  a 
collaborative platform to a provider of  the service considered the preliminary 
inquiry about the level of  control or influence exercised over the person that, at the 
end, performed the service:
This would require compliance with the following conditions:
a) Price. In this case, it should be the platform to set the final price to be paid 
by the user as beneficiary of  the underlying service.
b) Ownership of  key assets. The collaborative platform would own the key 
assets used to provide the underlying service.
c) Other essential contractual conditions. Thus, it would be for the platform 
to establish other terms and conditions, apart from price, that determine the 
contractual relationship between the underlying service provider and the user.
For the European Commission, the cumulative fulfillment of  these three 
conditions would determine the qualification of  the collaborative platform as the 
provider of  the underlying service, in particular with a view to assure the application 
of  the Services Directive.
If  not, the platform would be qualified as an “information society service 
provider” and would therefore be submitted to the E-commerce Directive.
III. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU)
Qualification of  collaborative platforms was recently appreciated by the CJEU. 
In the Elite Taxi/Uber decision,12 the problem was whether the Uber collaborative 
platform was subject to the E-commerce Directive or, in a different way, to the 
Services Directive.13
In this case, the CJEU first considered that Uber could, in abstract, be regarded 
as an intermediary and, in that case, be described as provider of  an “information 
society service”.14 On the other hand, a non-collective urban transport service, such 
11 The Communication also sought to provide non-binding guidance on how EU legislation applies to 
business models of  collaborative economy by examining five key issues relating to (1) market access 
requirements, (2) liability regime, (3) protection of  users, (4) self-employed workers and workers in 
the collaborative economy, and (5) taxation.
12 See Judgment Elite Taxi/Uber, 20 December 2017, case C-434/15, ECLI:US:C:2017:981. There are 
two other decisions of  the CJEU relating to Uber. The first concerns Uber France, 10 April 2018, case 
C-320/16, ECLI:C:2018:221 – which raised the question whether certain provisions of  national law 
applicable to services such as that proposed by Uber should have been notified as rules on services in 
aception of  the provisions of  EU law on the technical notice. A second reference for a preliminary 
ruling on that question was dismissed as it was considered inadmissible by order of  27 October 2016, 
Uber Belgium, case C-526/15, unpublished, EU:C:2016:830.
13 As stated by Advocate General Maciej Szpunar in the Opinion of  11 May 2017 in case C-434/15 
Elite Taxi, the object of  the process is quite limited and concerns “(...) whether possible rules on how Uber 
operates are subject to the requirements of  EU law, in the first place those relating to the freedom to provide services, or 
whether they fall within the scope of  the shared competence of  the European Union and the Member States in the field 
of  local transport, a competence which has not yet been exercised at EU level” (see paragraph 2).
14 See Paragraph 35 of  the Judgment and Article 1 (2) of  Directive 98/34, to which Article 2 (a) of  
the E-commerce Directive refers. This intermediation service constitutes, as the definition stated 
in Directive 98/34 provides, “any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by 
electronic means and at the individual request of  a recipient of  services”.
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as a taxi service, should be classified as a “transport service”.15
However, the CJEU noted that a service such as Uber is not limited to 
intermediation as it “(…) simultaneously offers urban transport services, which 
it renders accessible, in particular, through software tools such as the application 
at issue in the main proceedings and whose general operation it organises for the 
benefit of  persons who wish to accept that offer in order to make an urban journey” 
(see paragraph 38).
The existence of  the platform (application) Uber is, to the CJEU, essential to 
the activity so that without the application, “(…) those drivers would not be led to 
provide transport services and (ii) persons who wish to make an urban journey would 
not use the services provided by those drivers”.16 The application can therefore be 
considered essential for the functioning of  the market, being Uber, to be considered 
as a market-maker.
According to the CJEU, Uber exerts a decisive influence on the conditions 
of  the provision of  drivers, since, in particular, by applying at least the maximum 
price of  the journey it charges the customer before delivering a part of  it to the 
unprofessional driver of  the vehicle and ensures a certain degree of  control over 
the quality of  the vehicles and their drivers’ behavior, which may entail, when 
appropriate, their exclusion.17
The Court concluded that Uber forms an integral part of  a global service whose 
principal element is transport. In other words, although a mixed service is involved, 
the main element in this is transport. Uber should therefore be classified as “service 
in the field of  transport”18/19 and not an “information society service”.
In so far as it qualifies as a “service in the field of  transport”, it is not covered 
by Article 56 TFEU on the freedom to provide services in general. But Article 58(1) 
TFEU,20 which concerns the principle of  freedom to provide services, must be 
applied through the implementation of  a common transport policy.
15 See Paragraph 36 and Article 2, paragraph 2, point d) of  Directive-Services, read in the light 
of  recital 21 (see, to that effect, Trijber et Harmsen, 1 October 2015, case C-340/14 and C-341/14, 
EU:C:2015:641, paragraph 49).
16 See paragraph 39.
17 Indeed, as several authors observe, Uber provides the payment systems that drivers and consumers 
use; ensures the dynamic operation of  prices; charges commissions for each service provided and 
guarantees and supervises the quality of  the services provided by the drivers. See Colangelo and 
Maggiolino, Uber and the challenges for antitrust, 178. Commenting the Elite Taxi/Uber case, see Damien 
Geradin, “Online Intermediation Platforms and Free Trade Principles - Some Reflections on the Uber 
Preliminary Ruling Case”, SSRN Electronic Journal (April 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2759379 
and Margherita Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, “Uber in Europe: are there still judges in 
Luxembourg?,” CPI Antitrust Chronicle: Diving into online platforms, vol. 2 (Spring, 2018): 32-37, https://
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/AC_May.pdf.
18 See paragraph 40 and Article 2 (2) (d) of  the Services Directive. The Court added in paragraph 41: 
“(...)That classification is indeed confirmed by the case-law of  the Court, according to which the concept of  ‘services in 
the field of  transport’ includes not only transport services in themselves but also any service inherently linked to any 
physical act of  moving persons or goods from one place to another by means of  transport (see, to that effect, Judgment of  
15 October 2015, Grupo Itevelesa and Others, C-168/14, EU:C:2015:685, paragraphs 45 and 46, and Opinion 
2/15 (Free Trade Agreement with Singapore) of  16 May 2017, EU:C:2017:376, paragraph 61)”.
19 Thus, the E-commerce Directive, shall not apply to a brokerage service like Uber but is not subject 
to Services Directive, since, according to Article 2, paragraph 2, point (d) of  that directive, such 
services are expressly excluded from the scope.
20 See Paragraph 44 of  the Judgment: specific provision under which “(…) freedom to provide services in the 
field of  transport shall be governed by the provisions of  the Title relating to transport’ (see, to that effect, judgment of  22 
December 2010, Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetrieb, C-338/09, EU:C:2010:814, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited)”.
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According to the Court, knowing that non-collective urban transport services 
and services inextricably linked to it, such as Uber intermediary service, did not 
result in the adoption, by the European Parliament and the Council of  the European 
Union, of  common rules or other measures, on the basis of  Article 91 (1) TFEU, 
it is up to the Member States to regulate the conditions for the provision of  such 
services.21
In summary, the CJEU applied to Uber a test which, from this point of  
view, came to be known as “Uber test”, which aims to determine whether a given 
collaborative platform acts as a mere intermediary - consequently covered by the 
E-Commerce Directive - or as service provider - in this case covered by the Services 
Directive - in the light of  which it will be necessary to examine whether the following 
conditions are fulfilled:
(i) The indispensability of  the platform (application) for the provision of  the 
service (market-maker);
(ii) The exercise, by the platform, of  a decisive influence on the conditions of  
the provision of  the service, namely, by fixing:
a. Price (for example the maximum price);
b. Control over the quality of  the service provided;
c. Possibility of  exclusion of  service providers.
These criteria are similar, in some way, to those proposed by the European 
Commission in 2016, which included (i) price; (ii) ownership of  the main assets and 
(iii) other essential contractual conditions.
They are, however, less demanding because, for the CJEU, for a platform to be 
indispensable and capable of  exerting a decisive influence on the conditions of  the 
provision of  the service so that it is not only qualified as an intermediation service, it 
is not necessary to own the main assets as it arose from the communication, in 2016, 
of  the European Commission.
The Uber test will surely be used in the future to be applied to other collaborative 
platforms such as Airbnb. 
In that regard, in the Uber conclusions, Advocate General Maciej Szpunar 
seemed to qualify Airbnb as being part of  the information society services.22
The decision-making practice of  several competition authorities seems to go 
in the opposite direction. Several national competition authorities (e.g. in the UK, 
Germany, France and Sweden) considered recently in cases involving online travel 
agencies (such as Booking or Expedia) that they did not act as mere intermediaries, 
as they impose conditions essential for the definition of  the price, in particular by 
21 See Paragraphs 46 and 47 of  the Judgment.
22 In his Opinion delivered on Elite Taxi v Uber, 11 May 2017, case C-434/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:364, the 
Advocate General applied the Uber test to Airbnb in paragraphs 59 and following, stating that: “(…) in 
contrast to the situation of  Uber’s drivers, both hotels and airlines are undertakings which function completely independently 
of  any intermediary platform and for which such platforms are simply one of  a number of  ways of  marketing their services. 
Furthermore, it is the hotels and airlines — and not the booking platforms — that determine the conditions under which 
their services are provided, starting with prices. (22) These undertakings also operate in accordance with the rules specific 
to their sector of  activity, so that booking platforms do not exert any prior control over access to the activity, as Uber does 
with its drivers. 60.  Lastly, such booking platforms give users a real choice between several providers whose offers differ on a 
number of  important points from the users’ perspective, such as flight and accommodation standards, flight times and hotel 
location. By contrast, with Uber, these aspects are standardized and determined by the platform, so that, as a general rule, 
the passenger will accept the service of  the most quickly available driver”.
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means of  tariff  parity clauses.23/24
In my view, it is doubtful whether Airbnb should be considered indispensable 
and that it has a decisive influence on the providers of  the services. In this light, 
Airbnb would be covered by the E-commerce Directive. It is, therefore, expected 
that the decision of  the CJEU on the qualification of  this platform will reflect this.25 
IV. The regulation of collaborative platforms in the European 
Union
The emergence of  collaborative platforms has resulted in a kind of  “spontaneous 
liberalization” in the European Union and in the Member States.26
One of  the questions is whether they should be regulated by specific legislation 
– and in this case, whether this should be developed by the European Union or, 
subsidiarily, by the Member States – or, on a different way, only be submitted to the 
general regime applicable to all sectors of  economic activity (e.g. the General Regulation 
on Data Protection).27
The signals given by the European Commission allow it to anticipate that it does 
not want to intervene directly in the sector regulation stricto sensu of  some platforms 
collaboratively going instead to a strategy that some call “wait and see”.
23 On these clauses see Colangelo and Maggiolino, Uber and the challenges for antitrust, 183; Thibaud 
Vergé, “Are price parity clauses necessarily anticompetitive?,” CPI Antitrust Chronicle (January 2018), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CPI-Verge.pdf; 
Ariel Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of  Parity Clauses on Online Commerce,” European Competition 
Journal, vol. 11, issue 2-3 (2015): 488-519; Pinar Akaman, “The competition law assessment of  platform 
most favored customer clauses,” Journal of  Law and Economics, vol. 12, issue 4 (December 2016): 781-833; 
Margherita Colangelo, “Parity Clauses and Competition law in Digital Marketplaces: The Case of  Online 
Hotel Booking,” Journal of  European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 8, issue 1 (2017): 3-14 and Dennis W. 
Carlton and Ralph A. Winter, “Vertical Most - Favored - Nation Restraints and Credit Card No -Surcharge 
Rules,” The Journal of  Law and Economics, vol. 61, No. 2 (May, 2018): 215-251.
24 In the opposite direction, considering the irrelevance of  the tariff  parity clauses, see the opinion 
of  Advocate-General Maciej Szpunar presented on Elite Taxi/Uber, May 11, 2017, case C-434/15, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:364, footnote 22: “The fact that some platforms conclude rate parity agreements with hotels, 
under which hotels agree to refrain from offering rates elsewhere which are lower than those offered on the platform in 
question, is immaterial. These agreements do not involve the setting of  prices for the services by the platform, but a 
commitment concerning the rate-related treatment of  different trading partners. All the same, the competition authorities 
of  several Member States have questioned rate parity clauses, which led to the establishment of  the European working 
group on online booking platforms, under the aegis of  the Commission”.
25 The European Commission issued a press release on 16 July 2018 in which it drew Airbnb’s attention to 
the need to respect European consumer law and to ensure transparency of  prices, clarify conditions and 
suppress clauses allegedly illegal. The statement is available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
18-4453_en.htm. An application for a preliminary ruling concerning Airbnb Ireland is pending before 
the CJEU. See case C-390/18. In that case, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling are: (1) Do 
the services provided in France by Airbnb Ireland UC via an electronic platform operated from Ireland 
benefit from the freedom to provide services provided for in Article 3 of  Directive 2000/31 of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council of  8 June 2000? (2) The restrictive rules relating to the exercise 
of  the profession of  estate agent in France, laid down by Law 70-9 of  2 January 1970 on intermediaries 
relating to real estate transactions, Hoguet, are enforceable against Airbnb Ireland UC? On the application 
of  the Uber test to Airbnb, see Busch, The sharing economy at the CJEU.
26 Thus, see Damien Geradin, “Uber and the Rule of  Law: Should Spontaneous Liberalization Be 
Applauded or Criticized?,” Competition Policy International (2015); George Mason Law & Economics Research 
Paper, No. 15-53 (November 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693683.
27 On the application of  the General Regulation of  Data Protection to the collaborative economy see 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos, The collaborative Economy and US Law (Bloomsbury: Hart Publishing, 2018), 67-102.
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This strategy can be understood in light of  the principle of  conferral powers on 
the one hand and the principle of  subsidiarity on the other. There are activities for 
which the European Union has no powers – e.g. labour law28 or short-term lease - and 
in other cases, the principle of  subsidiarity may require the Member States to exert 
regulatory jurisdiction, as explained by the CJEU in the case of  Elite Taxi/Uber vis-a-vis 
the transport sector.
The neutrality followed by the European Commission makes it possible to move 
away from fracturing discussions around collaborative platforms, while ensuring de 
jure condito the essential legal regulation of  collaborative platforms.29 This, sometimes, 
unclear strategy has already been criticized by the European Parliament.30
This strategy for collaborative platforms and its specific regulation can be also 
understood because many of  the questions they raise can be addressed through existing 
legal instruments, such as competition law – as discussed below – or legislation such as 
the Services-Directive, the E-commerce-Directive31 the Payment Services Directive32 
or the General Regulation on Data Protection.33
Recently, the European Commission seems to have distanced itself  from the 
neutrality strategy referred to by submitting, in April 2018, a proposal for a Regulation 
on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of  on-line brokering 
services34. However, the proposal does not apply to collaborative platforms (like Uber 
and Airbnb) but only the “services of  online intermediation”.35 
The European Commission has, therefore, sought to ensure a certain degree of  
neutrality in the legal analysis of  collaborative platforms, distancing it from the epicenter 
28 As noted by the Advocate-General Maciej Szpunar in the conclusions presented in Elite Taxi/Uber, 
11 May 2017, case C-434/15, EU:C:2017:364, note 19 he “not will discuss the legal relationship between Uber 
and its drivers, since that aspect is subject to national law”.
29  It is also understandable, therefore, that the European Commission has adopted soft law instruments 
– such as the communication “A European Agenda for Collaborative Economy” – through which 
it seeks to explain the application of  existing legal instruments to electronic platforms or conducted 
several studies on collaborative economics such as the interesting one published in 2018 “Study to 
monitor the business and regulatory environment Affecting the collaborative economy in the EU”, 
available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/79bee7ad-6d22-11e8-
9483-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-72448577
30 See paragraph 15 of  the report on a European Agenda for Collaborative Economy of  11 May 
2017 (2017/2003 (ΙΝΙ)), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef= - // 
EP // TEXT + REPORT + 0 + DOC + A8-2017-0195 + XML + V0 // EN: “(...) regretted that the 
communication has not been sufficiently clear about the applicability of  existing EU legislation to different models of  
collaborative economics”. In this report, the European Parliament asked the European Commission for a 
“balanced, more comprehensive and ambitious strategy” for the European Union on the collaborative 
economy and presented a set of  recommendations.
31 This Directive provides in Article 16 for self-regulatory forms which have been used by some 
platforms such as Amazon or Ebay. In this regard see Hatzopoulos, The collaborative, 14.
32 Directive 2015/2366 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  25 November 2015 on 
payment services in the internal market.
33 This Regulation is a corollary of  the right to the protection of  personal data concerning them, 
provided for in Article 8 of  the European Charter of  Fundamental Rights. See Regulation 679/2016 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016 on the protection of  individuals 
with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free movement of  such data.
34 See Brussels, 26.4.2018, COM (2018) 238 final. The proposal was submitted under Article 114 
TFEU, which aims to approximate the provisions of  the Member States and ensure the application 
of  non-discriminatory and coherent rules within the Union.
35 The proposal defines these services, in accordance with Article 2 (2), as those constituting 
information society services within the meaning of  Article 1 (1) (b) of  Directive 2015/1535 of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council.
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of  a debate which, for some platforms such as Uber or Airbnb, is still controversial in 
several Member States and where there is still an ongoing discussion regarding many 
of  these activities.36 Many people support and encourage these platforms because of  
the benefits they bring to consumers in particular because of  the prices and innovation 
that underlie them.37 Many others criticize them for, among other reasons, calling into 
question typical traditional business models (e.g. taxis); for contributing to speculation 
and removal of  local populations in large urban centers (e.g. Airbnb) or even for being 
anti-democratic by qualifying platforms that aggregate data as, ironically, BAADD 
(“too big, anti-competitive, addictive and destructive to democracy”).38
Specifically, in the case of  taxis, licensing regulation was understood as a response 
to market failures,39 ensuring quality. The practice of  regulated prices, to the adjustment 
of  ex ante demand, is a way to avoid congestion in cities and, in the end, to protect 
consumers.40 However, in the opposite way, many say that regulation only allowed 
the interests of  incumbents to be safeguarded, generating an inability to increase 
competition. In this last dimension, the emergence of  electronic platforms helped to 
enhance competition and the welfare of  consumers and, doing so, raised the quality 
of  the services provided and introduced better price adjustments and more innovative 
offerings.41
36 On the democratic legitimacy of  the European Union in times of  economic crisis, Nuno Cunha 
Rodrigues, “Os novos muros da Europa,” European Analysis, Journal of  the Portuguese Association of  European 
Studies, vol. II, No. 198-207 (May, 2017), http://www.apeeuropeus.com/uploads/6/6/3/7/66379879/
european_analysis_2__3__2017.pdf.
37 Conducting an economic analysis of  the relationship between competition and innovation see 
Philippe Aghion, Stefan Bechtold, Lea Cassar and Holger Herz, “The Causal Effects of  Competition 
on Innovation: Experimental Evidence,” The Journal of  Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 34, No. 2 
(2018): 162-195.
38 Thus, see Evan Smith, “The Techlash Against Amazon, Facebook, and Google-and What They 
Can Do,” The Economist, January 20, 2018, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-
techlash-against-amazon-facebookand-google-and-what-they-can-do.
39 On the role of  economic regulation as an instrument for correcting market failures see Nuno 
Cunha Rodrigues, “A regulação da saúde”, in Regulação em Portugal, novos tempos, novo modelo? ed. Gonçalo 
Anastácio, Eduardo Paz Ferreira and Luís Silva Morais (Coimbra: Almedina, 2009), 613-651.
40 Among the main arguments put forward by those who advocate maintaining taxis regulation is the need 
to avoid a lack of  control to generate excessive taxis – with increased traffic congestion and pollution – and 
an increase competition between taxis likely to lead to a reduction in the quality of  the service provided. 
The regulation will also ensure the adequacy of  the prices charged to customers while safeguarding their 
safety. However, in the opposite direction, several authors point out that the regulation of  taxis has failed, 
generating a shortage of  supply, lack of  incentives to reduce prices, an increase in quality and innovative 
solutions, and in some cases the capture of  the regulator. On the regulation of  taxis in Portugal see 
International Transport Forum, Regulation of  For-Hire Passenger Transport. Portugal in International Comparison 
(Paris: ITF, 2016), https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/regulation-for-hire-passenger-
portugal.pdf. Carrying out the economic analysis of  the regulation of  taxis in Ireland, see Paul K. Gorecki, 
Evaluation of competitive impacts of government interventions, DAF/COMP/WP2(2014)6 (Paris: OECD, 2014), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP2(2014)6/en/pdf  and Colangelo and Maggiolino, 
Uber and the challenges for antitrust, 179.
41 Considering positive benefits from electronic transport platforms, see the report from the Portuguese 
Competition Authority (Autoridade da Concorrência), Relatório sobre Concorrência e Regulação 
no Transporte de Passageiros em Veículos Ligeiros, dezembro de 2016, available at http://www.
concorrencia.pt/vPT/Noticias_Eventos/ConsultasPublicas/Documents/Relat%C3%B3rio%20
sobre%20Concorr%C3%AAncia%20e%20Regula%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20no%20Transporte%20
de%20Passageiros%20em%20Ve%C3%ADculos%20Ligeiros.pdf, paragraph 165 and following 
(written in Portuguese). These benefits include reducing transaction costs; coordination and the 
creation of  supply side efficiencies (density savings); the mitigation of  asymmetries of  information 
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V. The application of competition law to collaborative platforms
The search for legal responses to collaborative platforms has found in the 
plasticity of  competition law fertile ground for discussion and mitigation of  some of  
the difficulties they may pose, as was already recognized by the CJEU.42 Still, the truth is 
that the application of  this branch of  law to collaborative platforms demands answers 
to previous questions.
Firstly, it is important to determine whether collaborative platforms are considered 
to be undertakings according to competition law.43
One should recall that the concept of  undertaking for the purposes of  competition 
law has been built from the praetorian construction of  the CJEU under which neither 
the legal personality, the legal status, financing arrangements or non-profit making are 
decisive for the definition. The decisive element is the pursuit of  an economic activity 
– which is considered to be the supply of  goods or services on a relevant market – 
autonomously, which can be carried out by a private profitable enterprise (even if  that 
economic activity is, at the end, specifically carried out by a non-profit entity).
In the case of  electronic platforms, it will be necessary to check whether they 
exercise an economic activity autonomously44 which seems to occur if  the Uber test 
conditions are met.45 In situations where this does not happen – verbi gratia if  the 
platform ensures P2P commerce model or is considered as a provider of  information 
society services – the question remains of  the application to electronic platforms of  
the concept of  undertaking for the purposes of  competition law to the extent that 
there is, strictly speaking, supply of  goods and services on a given market but the 
platforms only exercise a mere activity of  intermediation (not having control over the 
services provided).46
If  collaborative platforms are to be considered as undertakings for the purposes 
of  competition law, one will have to deal with a second issue: the determination of  the 
relevant market(s) in which they act.47 For example, in the recent past Uber argued that, 
since they provide information to the consumer and reduce the context of  uncertainty in which 
it makes its decision, namely regarding the conditions of  the services that will be provided (price, 
waiting time, quality); the different segments of  taxi services (hailing, taxi stands and pre-contracted 
services). With regard to the benefits of  platforms, see also Einav, Farronato and Levin, Peer-to-Peer 
Markets, 627-629.
42 Thus, see the Opinion of  the Advocate-General Maciej Szpunar presented on Elite Taxi/Uber,11 
May 2017, case C-434/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:364, paragraph 62: “(...) consider Uber a platform independent 
service providers could raise issues from the point of  view of  competition law. However, I shall not elaborate on this 
point more broadly, since it goes beyond the scope of  this case”.
43 On the concept of  undertaking according to competition law, see Nuno Cunha Rodrigues, A 
contratação pública como instrumento de política económica (Coimbra: Almedina, 2013), 381-386. See also, in 
the Portuguese Competition Law, Article 3 (1) of  Law No. 19/2012, of  8th May.
44 On the independent action of  an operator on the market, see Judgment Eturas, 21 January 2016, 
case C-74/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited therein.
45 In the specific case of  Uber, it may also be questioned whether the concept of  an undertaking covers 
the underlying service providers – the drivers acting in favor of  Uber – given the existing economic 
unit. In Italy, the courts have observed that Uber can not be considered disconnected from the drivers 
who provide the service since they are not free to negotiate the price with passengers and are obliged 
to apply tariffs calculated by an algorithm that raises prices when demand is increased. Thus, see 
Amato, Uber and the Sharing Economy, 178.
46 Notwithstanding, this too can be regarded as an economic activity and be defined as the relevant 
product market.
47 The relevant theoretical market concept must take into account the Commission notice on the 
definition of  the relevant market, even though it does not necessarily have to be followed by the 
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in India, it was part of  the product relevant market of  “radio taxi services in Delhi”. In 
New York, as part of  a complaint filed against the CEO of  Uber, it discussed whether 
the relevant product market for Uber was the “applications for car-sharing services”48 
or whether, on the opposite, it included “taxis, public transport and pedestrian routes”.49
In my view, this exercise is speculative vis-a-vis the novelty of  the platforms and 
the (lack) of  decision-making practice of  competition authorities around the world 
which is not yet sufficiently stabilized in order to allow it to consider the relevant 
markets in which electronic platforms such as Uber or Airbnb intervene.
There are, however, on-going investigations and decisions handed down by 
various competition regulators worldwide that legitimize the anticipation of  judgments 
on the possible application of  competition rules (if  one considers the qualification 
of  the collaborative platform as undertakings and the consequent relevant market is 
defined).50 
If  that happens, competition law can be applicable to electronic platforms and the 
assessment of  possible anti-competitive practices such as hub and spoke51 – where the 
collaborative platform would be considered as the hub –, the shared use of  algorithms 
between platforms (likely to be qualified as an agreement between undertakings)52 can 
occur [Article 101 (1) TFEU].
national competition authorities or the courts. See Commission Notice on the definition of  relevant 
market for the purposes of  Community competition law, OJEC No. C 372, (December 1997): 3.
48 The original definition corresponds to the market “mobile app-generated ride-share service market”. 
See the preliminary ruling available at https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-york/
nysdce/1:2015cv09796/451250/37/0.pdf?ts=1459545536. In this regard, see Parveer S Ghuman, 
“Analysis of  Competition Cases Against Uber Across the Globe,” Working Paper CUTS International 
(March 2017): 6, http://www.cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Analysis_of_Competition_Cases_Against_Uber_
Across_the_Globe.pdf
49 In this regard, see Ghuman, Analysis of  Competition Cases Against Uber, 6.
50 We limit ourselves to examining such practices in the light of  European Competition law, knowing 
that the national application of  Competition law follows the same line of  reasoning.
51 In a hub and spoke practice the agreement or concerted practice carried out between competing 
undertakings (spoke) is done indirectly through a third company (hub) which can act on the same 
market or even in a totally different market. In this regard see Judgment AC-Treuhand, 22 October 
2015, case C-194/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:717, paragraph 36 where it is recognized that Article 101 
(1) allows to react against the active contribution of  a company to a restriction of  competition even 
if  that contribution is not part of  an activity which is included on the relevant market in which this 
restriction materializes or is intended to materialize. See also the Opinion of  Advocate General Maciej 
Szpunar presented on Elite Taxi/Uber, 11 May 2017, case C-434/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:364, footnote 
23 where it states that “the use by competitors of  the same algorithm to calculate the price is not in itself  unlawful, 
but might give rise to hub-and-spoke conspiracy concerns when the power of  the platform increases” and Ariel Ezrachi 
and M. E. Stucke, “Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition”, CCLP 
Working Paper 40 (2015), 14.
52 See Article 101 (1) TFEU. On the distinction between agreements between undertakings and concerted 
practice, see Judgment AC-Treuhand, 22 October 2015, case C-194/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:717, in 
particular paragraphs 28; 29 and 32. On the anti-competitive effect of  the algorithms see Ai Deng, 
“What Do We Know About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion?,” Antitrust Magazine No. 33, 1 (2018): 88-95 
and Anita Banicevic, Gabrielle Z. A. Kohlmeier, Dajena Pechersky and Ashley Howlett, “Algorithms: 
challenges and opportunities for antitrust compliance,” ABA-SAL Compliance and Ethics Committee 
Spotlight, Special Report: Antitrust Law (Fall 2018). On the application of  competition law in the 
context of  the big data, see Eliana Garcés, “Data collection in online business platforms: a perspective 
for antitrust assessment,” CPI Antitrust Chronicle: Diving into online platforms, vol. 2 (Spring 2018): 17-
25, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/AC_May.pdf  
and Tánia Luísa Faria, “Direito da concorrência e big data: ponto da situação e perspectivas,” Revista 
Concorrência e Regulação ano VIII, n.º 29 (Jan/2017-Mar/2017): 107-137.
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Also practices of  predatory pricing;53 holding of  data by the same company54 
or the imposition, by a collaborative platform, of  tied or bundle sales (as practices of  
abuse of  dominant position)55 can be scrutinized (Article 102 TFEU).56
Still, one should take into account that any anti-competitive collective practices 
involving collaborative platforms [Article 101 (1) TFEU] can be justified in accordance 
with Article 101 (3) TFEU. Knowing the decisive role that the collaborative platforms 
play in innovation and the pro-competitive benefit that results from it,57 it is legitimate 
to recognize that, in some situations, practices pursued by collaborative platforms, 
sanctioned in light of  Article 101 (1) TFEU, can be justified under the conditions set 
out in Article 101 (3) TFEU.
In short, competition law can provide answers to new questions arising from 
collaborative platforms but does not, per se, solve all the problems posed by these,58 since 
it has a general ex-post application vocation59 (without prejudice to the proper field of  
application of  regulation on the control of  concentrations between undertakings).60
VI. Conclusions
The emergence of  collaborative platforms poses new challenges for the European 
Union and the Member States.
The CJEU contributed, with the Elite Taxi/Uber case, to establish some semblance 
of  clarity in the legal regime applicable to collaborative platforms, by defining a test 
that will surely be applied in the future to other forms of  collaborative economy.
Nevertheless, the European Commission has followed a neutral strategy (“wait 
53 On Uber’s practice of  predatory pricing in the United States see Nick Passaro, “Uber has an 
antitrust litigation problem, not an antitrust problem,” CPI Antitrust Chronicle: Diving into online 
platforms, vol. 2 (Spring 2018): 38-32, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/05/AC_May.pdf.
54 In this regard see Maurice E. Stucke, “Should we be concerned about data- opolis?,” Georgetown Law 
Technology Review, University of  Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper, n.º 349 (2018): 275-324, https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3144045.
55 In this regard see Hatzopoulos, The collaborative, 141.
56 There are also known complaints by Uber against taxi drivers for abusive litigation (sham litigation). In 
July 2018 CADE, in Brazil, filed a complaint by Uber against taxi drivers, available at http://www.cade.
goseebr/noticias/cade-arquiva-investigacao-no-applicadora-de-aplicativo-de-transport-individual-of-
passengers.
57 On the disruptive effect of  collaborative platforms on competition law see Riccardo Falconi, 
“Uber: Has digital economy disrupted competition law?,” Revista Concurrences, n.° 3-2018, article n.º 
87312 (September 2018).
58 Noting that the core problems that Uber and Airbnb face lie in the lack of  regulation; absence of  
fiscal framework and deregulation that they place in labor terms, see Selloni, Codesign for public-interest 
services, 21-26.
59 In other words, the intervention of  competition law arises as a result of  the undertakings actions in 
the markets. As Colangelo and Maggiolino, Uber and the challenges for antitrust, 187 noticed, “(...) anti-trust 
enforcers have limited powers. They can only forbid anticompetitive agreements, mergers and monopolistic practices. They 
can not prescribe obligations and commitments to impose, for example, Uber to comply with taxi regulations”.
60 In this regard see Ben Holles de Peyer, “US merger control and big data,” Journal of  Competition law 
& Economics, vol. 13, issue 4, (December 2017): 767-790. In Singapore, Uber was fined $ 13 million 
in September 2018 because, as a result of  the acquisition of  its subsidiary in Singapore by Grab 
(a local company competing with Uber), Grab had obtained a market share of  80%. Nevertheless, 
the acquisition was not reversed and remedies were set out by the National Competition Authority 
(Competition and Consumer Commission of  Singapore). For more information see https://www.
tnp.sg/news/singapore/grab-Uber-fined-13-million-breaking-competition-laws.
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and see”) for collaborative platforms that does not allow the required clarification of  
the regulatory model applicable.61
The debate around the regulation of  collaborative platforms – such as Uber or 
Airbnb – remains open.62
In the absence of  a response from the European Union, some Member States 
have regulated some of  the collaborative platforms, as in Portugal with respect to 
Uber63 and possibly Airbnb.64
These forms of  regulation emerge at a national level,65 to the detriment of  a 
61 Many authors point out that there is a lack of  definition regarding an ex-ante or ex-post model of  
regulation namely concerning the definition of  a model (a) ex-ante or ex-post; (b) bottom-up or top-
down or collaborative; (c) local; national or supranational or (d) transversal or sectorial. See Hatzopoulos, The 
collaborative, 217-220.
62 Some Member States have chosen to ban part of  the services provided by Uber. Uberpop platform 
was banned in Member States such as France; Italy and Germany. Uberblack was banned in Italy but 
readmitted later in May 2017 following a decision of  the Court of  Rome. Reporting several court 
cases in Europe, see Amato, Uber and the Sharing Economy, 177-183 and Colangelo and Maggiolino, Uber 
and the challenges for antitrust, 179. See the opinion of  Advocate-General Maciej Szpunar, presented on 
Elite Taxi/Uber, 11 May 2017, case C-434/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:364, footnote 12 where some court 
decisions of  Member States are listed as to the manner in which Uber operates, such as the judgment 
of  the London Employment Tribunal of  28 October 2016, Aslam, Farrar and Others see Uber (case 
2202551/2015); decision of  the Audiencia Provincial de Madrid n ° 15/2017, dated January 23, 2017, 
in the lawsuit filed by Uber against the Asociación Madrileña del Taxi, and order of  the Tribunale 
Ordinario di Milano of  July 2, 2015 (cases 35445/2015 and 36491/2015).
63 The Portuguese Competition Authority (Autoridade da Concorrência) presented, in December 
2016, a Report on Competition and Regulation on the Transport of  Passengers in Vehicles (Relatório sobre 
Concorrência e Regulação no Transporte de Passageiros em Veículos Ligeiros), available at http://
www.concorrencia.pt/vPT/Noticias_Eventos/ConsultasPublicas/Documents/Relat%C3%B3rio%20
sobre%20Concorr%C3%AAncia%20e%20Regula%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20no%20Transporte%20
de%20Passageiros%20em%20Ve%C3%ADculos%20Ligeiros.pdf. In this report, AdC criticizes the 
model in force in Portugal for the provision of  taxi services because it considers that “(...) regulatory tariffs 
eliminate price as a variable of  competition and limit the incentives of  operators to compete in the binomial quality / price 
(...)” which could “(...) imply losses of  welfare” (see p.1). This is why the AC understood that the legislation 
then in force which established provisions regarding (i) Regulation at the level of  entry into the market; 
(ii) Regulation of  price of  services and (iii) Regulation of  quality / safety and other aspects of  the 
exercise of  the activity should be changed. Later, in 2018, in Portugal, the so-called “Uber Law” – Law 
n.º 45/2018, of  August 10 – was approved. It regulates the transportation in a deprived vehicle that 
provides services to an electronic platform (TVDE). It should be noted, however, that in accordance 
with article 1, paragraph 2, this law does not apply to: (A) Electronic platforms that are only aggregators 
of  services and do not define the terms and conditions of  a business model own (B) vehicles sharing 
activities without profit (carpooling) and vehicle rental without a short conductor with sharing features 
(carsharing), organized or not by platform electronic. In other words, the law only applies to collaborative 
platforms that pass the “Uber test”, with the remaining ones – including those that do not pass the test or 
that act in the context of  the sharing economy (P2P) – outside the scope of  that law.
64 Some municipalities in Portugal have considered the application of  limits to the provision of  local 
accommodation, thus conditioning the activity pursued by collaborative platforms such as Airbnb.
65 As the Portuguese Competition Authority notes in the Report on Competition and Regulation on 
the Transport of  Passengers in Vehicles, p. 46, the regulatory framework must respect three pillars of  
efficient regulation: (i) necessity, (ii) proportionality, and (iii) non-discrimination. The International 
Transport Forum, in the 2016 document entitled App-based ride and taxi services: Principles for regulation, 
p. 30 (available at https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/app-ride-taxi-regulation.pdf) 
proposes ten principles for regulation which should (i) be limited to correcting market failures; (ii) rely 
on the most efficient tools; (iii) be technologically neutral and non-discriminatory between operators; 
(iv) allow for regular impact assessment; (v) ensure the sharing of  regulatory responsibilities; (vi) be 
clear and easily understandable; (vii) be adaptable; (viii) be objective; (ix) be based on fundamental 
economic principles and (x) be inclusive of  all social groups.
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European approach which would lead to greater harmonization at the European level 
and to the affirmation of  a level playing field within the Internal Market, although it 
could produce misunderstandings among populations in the face of  the divergence of  
opinion that persists in many Member States.
For all these reasons, it is expected that the European Commission’s strategy will 
continue favoring the issuance of  soft law instruments and the ability of  the actual legal 
framework of  EU law to provide answers to some of  the legal challenges posed by 
collaborative platforms.
It is certain that the arrival of  collaborative platforms, regardless of  future 
developments that may have led to the modification of  behavior in often less dynamic 
and innovative sectors – given the fact that many are incumbents – provoked what 
some refer to an electric shock in many industries, which led to an increase in the 
quality and efficiency of  several services previously provided without competition, 
thus broadening the well-being of  consumers.66 The legal classification of  these 
services is, therefore, essential for determining the regulatory framework applicable 
to the collaborative economy nowadays.
66 Thus, see Geradin, Uber and the Rule of  Law and Colangelo and Maggiolino, Uber and the challenges for 
antitrust, 188: “(...) the best way to fight illegal business models is to develop legal business models that are equally good 
and efficient. After all, this is what the piracy teaches us about”.
